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Summary  findings
How can one account for the puzzling behavior of  firms' taxable cash f ows will have been reduced through
insider-managers who, in stripping assets from the very  cash flow diversion, have responded by collecting
firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to  revenues in kind.
fill the other?  To disentangle these vicious circles of control, Desai
Desai and Goldberg suggest that such asset-stripping  and Goldberg propcse  a pilot for transforming
and failure to restructure are the consequences of  ownership in insidet-dominated  firms through  a system
interactions between insiders (manager-owners) and  of simultaneous tax-debt-for-equity conversion and
regional governments in a particular property rights  resale through  competitive auctions.
regime. In this regime, the ability to realize value is  The objective: to show regional governments, by
limited by uncertainty and illiquidity, so managers have  example, that a more sustainable way to protect
little incentive to increase value. As the central  employment is to give managers incentives to increase
institutions that rule Russia have ceded their powers to  enterprises' value by transferring effective control to
the regions, regional governments have imposed various  investors.
distortions on enterprises to protect local employment.  The proposed mechanism would provide cash benefits
Prospective outsider-investors doubt they can acquire  to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors.
the control rights they need for restructuring firms and  The increased cash ievenue (rather than in-kind or
doubt they can avoid the distortions regional  money surrogates) would enable regional governments to
governments impose on the firms in which they might  finance safety nets for the unemployed and to promote
invest. The result: little restructuring and little new  other regional initia:ives.
investment. And regional governments, knowing the
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A centerpiece of Russia's real sector reforms-the  privatization of 15,000
enterprises through vouchers-was  to make the transition to a market credible,
irreversible, and rapid. The objective of the mass privatization program (MPP) was to
establish a critical mass of profit-seeking corporations, no longer  dependent upon state
support for their survival, and a class of owners willing to invest in their enterprises and
manage their restructuring.' The Russian MPP, however, has brought few tangible
benefits to enterprises privatized in voucher auctions.  Ineffective corporate governance,
little new investment, and the distortions of continuing government intervention have
limited the amount of restructuring these firms could undertake in practice.  A diverse
constellation of indicators now suggests that, among firms in other transition countries of
comparable wealth, Russian firms are ranked at the bottom in terms of output, factor
productivity, profitability, and cost efficiency.  Recent surveys of Russian industrial
sectors, moreover, conclude that the policies of regional governments tend to favor low-
productivity incumbents, protecting them from takeovers and more productive new
entrants.2
In this paper we suggest that the absence of restructuring and investment are the
consequences of interactions between insiders (manager-owners), and regional
governments within a particular property rights system.  Two inter-related features of this
system are consequential to the Russian real-sector problem.  First, regional governments
still use enterprises to protect local employment. In the Russian regions, govermments
face a tradeoff between enforcing cash-based tax collections and maximizing tax
revenues, on the one hand, and extracting "social" benefits in the form of excess
employment on the other.  If the managers-owners were to maximize the value of the
firm, the firm would be left vulnerable to expropriatory policies that alter the net return
on investment-e.g.,  restrictions on layoffs, costly regulations or tariffs, etc.
Anticipating that, managers choose instead to maximize the private benefits of control,
and no restructuring is accomplished.  The regional governments, knowing that the
taxable revenue of the firm will have been reduced as a result of cash-flow diversion,
respond by collecting revenues in kind and enacting policies that force firms to maintain
employment levels.  These regional governments, then, are as "vested" in maintaining the
status quo as are enterprise insiders, and will willingly shield insiders from takeover
attempts, obstruct the enforcement of outsider's property rights, and perpetuate the
l  Among the purported benefits of vouchers:  "[T]o sever the links between the state and the enterprises, to
school the population in market basics, and to foster further ownership change.  . ." See, e.g., Cheryl W.
Gray, "In Search of Owners: Privatization and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies," World
Bank Research Observer 11, 2 (1996): 179-197.
2 See, e.g., McKinsey & Co., Unlocking Economic Growth in Russia (Moscow: McKinsey Global
Institute, 1999), which points out that Russia's  labor productivity has fallen from 30% of the U.S. level in
1991 to 19% in 1997.  Other surveys can be found in EBRD, Transition Report 1998 (London:  EBRD,
1999), p. 130; Simon Commander and Andrei Tolstopiatenko, "Enterprise Restructuring and the Structure
of Compensation: Why is Unemployment Low in the FSU?" World Bank, 1996; John Earle and Saul
Estrin, "After Voucher Privatization: The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Russian Manufacturing
Industry," 1997.
2enterprise as a source of private benefits for the manager, and as a source of social and
political benefits for the region.
Second, control rights are not automatically granted along with ownership rights,
due primarily to the unenforceability of investment contracts in the Russian economy. In
this environment, outsiders-investors must choose whether to invest or not.  In economies
with fully enforceable property rights, investment decisions would be contractually (and
therefore automatically) accompanied by the transfer of control rights.  Where control
rights and cash-flow rights are separable, the transfer of control becomes, to a large
extent, a matter subject to considerable uncertainty and managerial discretion. Outsider-
investors, therefore, have little confidence that they will achieve effective control despite
of buying (nominal) majority stakes in the company, or that the regional governments
will resist imposing distortions once the investment takes place.
This paper is organized as follows.  Section two details t]he  system of enterprise
insider ownership that evolved as a result of the MPP.  The third section examines the
role of regional governments in using enterprises to protect employment and derive other
benefits, and describes recent attempts by regional governments to reassert control over
local enterprises. In the last section, we outline two related proposals for transferring
ownership in Russian enterprises from insiders to external investors through cooperation
between investors and regional governments:  (i) investor-regional government initiated
bankruptcy; and (ii) property rights enforcement through a simultaneous tax debt-for-
equity swap and resale, which we term "Investment-Based Ownership Transformation."
We conclude that the first approach is not viable due to lhe onus placed on a weak
and overloaded judicial system. The second approach, in our view, is more workable in
the present Russian economy.  This decentralized approach to transforming ownership
will potentially accomplish the following reforms. First, by allowing coalitions of
outsider-investors to acquire large share blocs, this approach creates the basis for
improved corporate governance.  Second, this approach allows participating enterprises
to be reincarnated debt free.  Third, this approach, if used alongside bankruptcy
procedures, can promote much-needed contestability in the market for corporate control.
Fourth, by providing regional governments a means of increasing revenue from cash
taxation, rather than offsets and barter, it enables a much-needed restructuring of
subnational public finances.
II. INSIDER  CONTROL
Property rights over enterprises had already been allocated de facto during the
Soviet era. Well before the collapse of the Soviet Union, state-enterprise directors
benefited-even  profited-from  many of the rights associated with "ownership and the
outcome of the privatization program adopted in 1992 reflected these pre-existing
institutional constraints. 3 Following the 1989 Law on State Enterprises entrepreneurial
state-enterprise directors set up the numerous Gorbachev-era entities-cooperatives,
collectives, and joint ventures-that  fed off of large state enterprises.  Article 7 of the law
3 See  Michael  McFaul,  State  Power,  Institutional  Change,  and  the Politics  of Privatization  in Russia,"
World Politics 47, 2 (1995):  210-243.
3gave enterprise directors (and employees) in an enterprise the right to lease its assets;
ultimately, these leased assets could be purchased at once or in installments through the
cooperative or collective. 4 Subsequent decrees in 1989 and 1990 on lease and leasing
relations expanded the ability of employees to propose lease arrangements. Although
leases were meant to be awarded on a competitive basis, no competitions were held in
practice, and nearly all leases were awarded by enterprise insiders to themselves. 5
Between 1991 and the end of 1992, the number of lease enterprises rose from 2,400 to
almost 9,500.
The intent of the law, of course, was to decentralize the elaboration of annual
plans.  Indeed, at the time lease buy-outs were viewed by some as an embryonic form of
privatization-one  that, if regulated, might engender a smooth (stable, controlled)
transition.6 They were, however, little more than profit-sharing arrangements for the
management and employees.  Buy-outs were often set up for arbitrage purposes-to
secure inputs at subsidized prices, sell goods at uncontrolled prices, and pocket the
difference.  Directors thus reaped the benefits of their control rights while the costs and
liabilities associated with ownership remained socialized.
When the Russian Privatization Law was passed in 1992, all lease enterprises
whose agreements were entered into prior to the passage of the law were treated in a
separate category of enterprise.  In these circumstances, redemption was carried out as
specified in the lease. But in an untold number of cases, the redemption terms were
unclear or unspecified. 7 In these situations, lease enterprises were privatized with other
enterprises, but leaseholders were given a "priority" in purchasing shares.  Thus the
overlap between enterprises privatized by voucher, and enterprise that were part of the
leasing program is difficult to estimate.
Unlike enterprise directors in countries such as Czechoslovakia and Poland,
where SOE reform laws enabled the Communist Party to remove under-performing
managers as late as 1989, the USSR had no such opportunity.  Here, enterprise insiders-
managers and employees-had  both the incentive and the power to defend themselves
against Yeltsin's attempts to reallocate property rights through rapid privatization.
Workers, due to a paternalistic relationship under managers, the absence of labor
markets, the lack of sectorally based trade unions, and the direct provision of social
services by enterprises, did not constitute a distinctive group with interests opposed to
management.  On the contrary workers and managers were traditionally more or less
4 Leonid Grigoriev, "Ulterior Property Rights and Privatization: Even God Cannot Change the Past," in
Anders Xslund, ed., The Post-Soviet Econonmy:  Soviet and Western Perspectives (London, Pinter, 1992), p.
200.
S  Roman Frydman, et al., The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States (London:
CEU Press, 1993), pp. 20-22.
6See  Igor Filatotchev, Trevor Buck, and Mike Wright, "Privatization and Buy-Outs in the USSR," Soviet
Studies 44, 2 (1992):  265-282.
7  Leases would run between five and fifteen years, and redemption clause simply allowed the lessor to
purchase the property at the end of the term.  But in many cases, the property sharing arrangements upon
the conclusion of the lease were extremely vague-typically  based on principles of self-government and
worker participation, but leaving unspecified the governance structure of the enterprise.
4united in their common struggle to bargain for lower production quotas. 8 Consequently
workers made no claims against property rights distinct from managers.  Together,
workers and managers constituted a pressure group, which dedicated itself towards
ensuring that enterprise insiders received the numerous privileges that ultimately, made
their way into the Russian MPP.  As Gaidar himself later conceded, "Beginning in May
and June [of 1992] it was impossible to stand up to the pressure of the industrial lobby." 9
Thus it is that the designers of the Russian MPP confronted the following political reality:
pre-existing institutional arrangements that distort free markets cannot be wiped clean by
governmental fiat.
The scope and results of the MPP are well known and require little summary. A
central difference between the MPP in Russia and similar programs in the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic and in Poland was in the tradability of Russian vouchers.  Under
the three variants of the Russian program, insiders could purchase up to 51% of
enterprise shares.  The tradability of vouchers, on the other hand, allowed insiders to
purchase additional shares-65%  on average.'0 Tradable vouchers, then, may have
turned out to be an instrument of insider control, rather than the intended means of
consolidating outsider ownership.
Despite conflicting evidence on managerial turnover in thle  past year, there is
general agreement that managers and salaried employees continue to hold approximately
50-60% of shares in privatized enterprises."  Estimates of ownership structure have
varied across different enterprise surveys, which are difficult to compare over time.  We
present estimate ranges for stock ownership in privatized Russian enterprises below.  It is
interesting to note that the greatest variation tends to be for empLoyees  and managers as
owners, perhaps reflecting the empirical (as well as theoretical) difficulties in separating
the two.
Nevertheless, one of the critical shortcomings of the Russian MPP is that it did
not enable an institutional concentration of ownership through fiLnancial  intermediaries
such as investment funds (as did the Czech and Polish programs) 2.  The designers
8  See,  e.g.,  John Willerton,  Patronage  and  Politics  in the USSR  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,
1992);  Michael  McFaul,  "Russian  Centrism  and Revolutionary  Transformation,"  Post-Soviet  Affairs  9
(1993).
9 "Gaidar  v. Gaidar,"  New Times 17 (April 1993),  p. 18. The "industrial  lobby,"  in Gaidar's re-telling,
consisted  of the Russian  Union  of Industrialists  and Entrepreneurs,  its political  affiliate  the Civic  Union,  the
Russian  Assembly  of Social  Partnership  (an umbrella  trade  union),  and  most importantly,  the legislators  in
the Congress  of People's Deputies.
10  Joseph  Blasi  and  Andrei  Shleifer,  "Corporate  Governance  in Russia:  an Initial  Look,"  in Roman
Frydman, et al., eds., Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia (London: CEU Press, 1996).
11  Alexander  Radygin,  "Ownership  and  Control  of Russian  Industry,"  paper presented  at the OECD-USAID
Conference  on Corporate  Governance  in Russia,  Moscow,  May 31-June  2, 1999.
12 A critique  (by  one of the authors  of this paper)  of the Russian  MPP that did not enable  an institutional
concentration  of ownership  through  financial  intermediaries  such  as investment  funds can be found  in:
Goldberg,  I., G. Jedrzejczak,  and M. Fuchs,  The "IPO-PLUS"  A New Approach  to Privatization,  Policy
Research  Working  Paper 1821,  The World  Bank,  Washington,  D.C.,  Augusil  1997. This  paper presents  an
alternative  model  of privatization,  whose  feature  is a built-in  mechanism  of initial  share concentration  in
5believed that consolidation would occur spontaneously as the investment funds, acquiring
vouchers from employees, would use them to gain sufficient blocs in privatized
enterprises.  The table below shows limited evidence of that happening in the past five
years-mainly  attributable to the increasing acquisitions by Russian holding companies
and industrial groups after 1994.
Even in those enterprises in which management-held shares are nominally in the
minority, managers have at their disposal a variety of techniques by which their de facto
control exceeds their nominal share ownership. Where "outsider" shareholders were
fragmented, control was effectively ceded to managers.  Employees were the largest
category of shareholder in most enterprise put through the MPP, yet many of their shares
are non-voting. In addition, managers have often taken to imposing (illegally) bans on
the selling of shares to outsiders, placing limits on share ownership, and using implicit
threats (dismissal, wage cuts, limitations on access to social assets) on workers who
violate these rules.  Faced with the prospect of takeovers, managers typically issued new
shares (also often illegally) in order to dilute the power of outsiders.
Table 1: Estimates of Ownership in Russian Enterprises, 1994-199913
(% of Share  Capital)
1994  1995  1996  1997  19991
Employees  44-56  39-49  26-43  23-40  36
Managers  9-17  10-17  12-18  12-36  15
Domestic  Legal
Entities2 711  20-23  23-25  22-24  23
Domestic  3-6  9-11  8-12  11-13  16
Individuals
Foreign Owners  1-2  1-2  1-2  4-5  8
State  Agencies  12-20  11-13  9-11  7-14  3
1.  No survey  undertaken  in 1998.
2.  Includes  investment  funds,  all  other  firms  (including  holding  companies  and  financial-industrial  groups),  and
banks.
private  investment  funds. Similar  critique  by the same  author  is mentioned  in John Nellis,  "Time  to
Rethink  Privatization,"  Finance  and  Development 36,  2 (1999): 16-19.
13  Estimates  vary  considerably  depending  on when,  during  the course  of the year, the survey was taken,
and on the sample  size. Figure  ranges  are taken  from the following:  for 1994,  Blasi  and Shleifer,
"Corporate  Governance  in Russia,"  Radygin,  "The  Russian  Model  of Mass  Privatization:  Governmental
Policy  and  First Results,"  in Privatization,  Conversion,  and  Enterprise  Reform in  Russia (Boulder,  Col.:
Westview,  1995);  for 1995,  Blasi, "Corporate  Ownership  and  Corporate  Governance  in the Russian
Federation,"  in Ira Liebermjan,  Stilpon  Nestor,  and Raj Desai,  eds. Between  State and  Market: Mass
Privatization  in Transition  Economies  (Washington,  D.C./Paris: World  Bank/OECD,  1997),  Radygin,
"Securities  Market  Development  and  its Relationship  to Corporate  Governance,"  paper  presented  at OECD
conference  on Capital  Markets,  1996;  for 1996: Blasi  et al, Kremlin  Capitalism:  Privatizing  the Russian
Economy  (Ithaca,  N.Y.: Cornell  University  Press, 1997),  Radygin,  S. Aukutsionek,  et al., "Dominant
Shareholders  and Performance  of Industrial  Enterprises,"  Russian  Economic  Barometer  1 (1998): 8-41,
Institute  for Economies  in Transition,  Annual  Report  1996 (Moscow:  IET Press, 1996);  for 1997: Simeon
Djankov,  "Business  as Unusual,"  World  Bank, 1998;  data from IET; 1999  figures  are from  Radygin,
"Ownership  and  Control  of Russian  Industry."
6Figure  1: Structure  of Russian  Enterprise  Debts,  1994-1999
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Source:  Russian  Economic  Trends
* As of March, 1999
Meanwhile, although the fiscal situation of the Russian government has been
actually improving since early 1998, the enterprise sector has remained in a low-
investment, low-productivity trap. Large enterprises have been able to build up
significant wage, supplier, and tax arrears, while bartering whatever goods they did
produce in their place.  According to Goskomstat's own figures, by mid 1999, overdue
accounts receivables on enterprise balance sheets amounted to 40% of GDP, while barter
reached approximately one-half of all industrial sales.1 4 The evolution of different arrears
can be seen in figure 1 above, which shows the composition of the main enterprise
liabilities for four sectors (industry, agriculture, construction, and transport). Figure 2
below illustrates the rise in overdue liabilities and receivables as percentages of their
respective totals.  Meanwhile total enterprise receivables and payables (represented by
the dashed lines) have more than doubled as a share of GDP between 1995 and 1998.
Most firms have resorted to arrears as a source of trade credit at a time when the volume
of bank credit has been shrinking.  Moreover, the growing gap between payables and
receivables indicates the increasing indebtedness of these four sectors to other sectors in
the economy, mainly to the utilities (Gasprom and UES).
14 Russian Economic Barometer and Russian Economic Trends.  World Bank, "Dismantling Russia's
Nonpayments System: Creating Conditions for Growth" 1999.
7Why  Insiders  Do Not Maximize  Value
Every system of corporate governance is a structure of control rights such that
suppliers of finance assure themselves that their investment will not be squandered by
those to whom it is entrusted.  In the classic agency perspective, agency costs arise from
(i) monitoring expenditures by the principals; (ii) resources spent by insiders to guarantee
to outside shareholders that shirking shall be limited, or "bonding" expenditures by the
agents; and (iii) the "residual loss," or the reduction in the value of the firm that obtains
when the owner dilutes his ownership stake.' 5 Firms that are owned by managers and
salaried employees, from this perspective, should face smaller agency costs of corporate
control than those hold by outsiders.  There should be no need for a governance system in
enterprises wholly owned by those who initiate and implement decisions, provide the
financing, and bear the residual risks (and returns) associated with those decisions. Thus
we are faced with having to account for the puzzling behavior of insider-managers in
Russia-as  well as other post-socialist environments in which privatized firms are insider
dominated-who,  in stripping assets from the very firms they own, appear to be stealing
from one pocket to fill the other.
The central problem of corporate governance in Russia, however, does not
involve the protection of minority shareholders or other financiers.  Here, manager-
owners do not face sufficient incentives to restructure the firm and maximize its value
over the long run for three possible reasons.  First, due to the problems of property rights
delineation, manager-owners perceive title as uncertain and temporary, potentially
subject to expropriation.  With short time horizons, then, their expected gain from
increasing value and share appreciation or dividends is typically less than the value of
stripped assets.  Second, maximizing value is a reasonable long term objective only if
value can be realized.  The confidence of managers-owners that if they increase value it
can be realized by selling their shares is limited: as will be described below, insider
control is so entrenched that an outside investor has little confidence that he will be able
to take control of the fimn even if he buys a significant share.  Given this illiquidity of
secondary markets, managers have little incentive to increase value and might instead sell
the actual assets themselves as a way of alienating their control rights.  Third, since in
many cases the managers do not have formal claim to shares of employees (although they
control their voting rights), distribution of dividends and realization of capital gains
creates the potential for severe conflicts between employees and managers.  Barter allows
an opaque income accounting to hide income from employees (as well as from the
authorities), as we discuss below.
Asset  Stripping  and Diversion  of Cash  Flows
While the original rationale for quick privatization was to prevent asset stripping
by managers in SOEs, manager-owners have significantly degraded enterprise assets ever
since. Instead of increasing a firm value through reinvestment, enterprise managers-
owners have typically extracted income streams from these firms at the expense of
'5  As ownership  is diluted  greater  managerial  discretion  implies  a loss to profits that  is responsible  for the
residual  loss. See  Michael  Jensen  and William  Meckling,  "Theory  of the Firm: Managerial  Behavior,
Agency  Costs,  and Capital  Structure,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics  3 (1976): 305-60;  for an alternative
perspective,  see Oliver  Williamson,  "Corporate  Finance  and Corporate  Governance,"  Journal  of Finance
43 (1988): 567-591.
8minority shareholders. The managers have diverted cash flows to offshore accounts and
shell corporations, concentrated losses among subsidiaries held by outsiders (rather than
evenly distributing them between insider-owned holding company and subsidiary), and
by delaying the payment of dividends. Since dividends are taxable and have to be shared
with other stockholders, managers-owners are more inclined to withdraw cash flows from
their enterprises through fictitious expenses or theft.'6
Efforts to halt or limit this kind of asset degradation-through  enhanced
supervisory powers of the Federal Commission on the Securities Market, or through the
empowerment of the anti-monopoly office-have,  in recent years, been successfully
blocked by a coalition of enterprise insiders and regional governments, together with
their allies in the Duma.  These beneficiaries of "partial reform" lhave  effectively frozen
in place the rents (and the opportunities for theft) generated by distortions in the Russian
economy, namely, the absence of further reforms of the property rights and corporate
governance regime.1 7 It has been suggested that enterprises in the interim period between
corporatization and privatization are the most prone to asset stripping. In the Russian
economy, however, one of the notable pathologies of the control of insiders and Regional
Governments over enterprises is that asset stripping and cash flowv  diversions occur under
private ownership.
Insider Control and Barter
While tax arrears constitute subsidies by regional govermnents to firms, there is
reason to believe that non-cash settlements, however, are driven by insider control. The
Russian system of taxation and payments (e.g. freezing of bank accounts) has been
frequently cited as a key rationale for barter.'8 If this explanation were true, Russia, in
this sense, would have been something of an anomaly.  Excessive and arbitrary taxation
in middle income countries, while likely to promote financial disintermediation (cash
being less traceable than bank transfers and checks) does not necessarily prompt barter.
In Russia, as the State Tax Service has taken to deducting tax payments directly from
ruble bank accounts of debtor companies, these same firms have used offshore banking
whenever cash transactions have been necessary.
Our analysis, by contrast, leads to an additional explanatiDn  for the prominence of
barter in the Russian economy, namely, that barter is a consequenice  of corporate
governance failures.  In this sense, barter is both a means of avoiding the payment of
private or public debts in cash and a way of concealing the real state of affairs not only
from tax authorities, but from minority shareholders (and indeed, even "passive
16 Itzhak  Goldberg  and  Raj Desai,  "Corporate  Governance  in Russia,"  in Harry  Broadman,  ed.,  Russia's
Enterprise  Reforms,  World Bank  Discussion  Paper  400,  The World  Bank, Washington,  D.C., 1998.
17 Joel  Hellman,  "Winners  Take  All: The Politics  of Partial  Reform  in Post Communist  Transition", World
Politics  50, 2 (1998): 203  -234.
18 See,  for example  Kathryn  Hendley,  Barry  Ickes,  and Randy  Ryterman,  "Remonetizing  the Russian
Economy,"  in Harry  Broadman,  ed., Russian  Enterprise  Reformn:  Policies  to Further  the Transition
(Washington,  D.C.: World  Bank, 1999);  Simon  Commander  and Christian  Mumssen,  "Understanding
Barter  in Russia,"  Working  Paper  37, EBRD,  London,  December  1998;  Clifford  Gaddy  and Barry  Ickes,
"Beyond  a Bailout: Russia's Virtual  Economy,"  Foreign  Affairs  (September-October,  1998).
9"shareholders such as employees. Non-cash settlements also enable manager-owners to
degrade assets in a less transparent environment. 19
Non-cash transactions, therefore, are an instrument by which manager-owners
hide transactions from employees and from outsiders-both  minority shareholders and
tax authorities.  Those who argue that changes in enterprise ownership will have no effect
until hard budget constraints and payments discipline are ensured have the sequence
reversed. In the Russian economy, both non-payment and barter-in  addition to allowing
non-viable enterprises to remain in operatioil-are  used by enterprise insiders to preserve
their power through opaqueness and fraud.  Payments discipline cannot be improved
unless there are, in parallel, significant changes in the incentives of managers-owners and
regional governments.
III. REGIONAL  GOVERNMENTS  AND  ENTERPRISE  CONTROL
Although the Russian federal government has perhaps long since given up
attempts to intervene in company management, regional governments have continued to
exert a strong influence over the actions of key enterprises, regardless of whether they
have been formally privatized.  Indeed, the unwillingness of regional governments to
draw sharp distinctions between public and private property, or to impose hard budget
constraints on large enterprises, both from fear of unemployment and to preserve rent-
seeking opportunities for vested interests is another key factor in the un-enforceability of
property rights and ownership.  As the central organs of the Russian state have lost their
powers of regulation and control to the regions, regional administrations have seized
these powers in a bid to maintain economic operations of major local enterprises, as well
as to protect the local workforce from economic change.  One recent study concludes that
the devolution of economic control to the regions has preserved the sub-national
administrative and hierarchical structures of the Soviet system, as well as the power and
influence of those who manage them. 20
Attempts by regional governments to protect employment by preventing firms
from changing production lines or employment levels constitute a significant distortion
on enterprise operations.  Anticipating such distortions, managers have often engaged in a
"pre-emptive" diversion of cash flows (see appendix). In certain regions, moreover,
(especially in one-company towns) the nexus of interdependence between government
officials and enterprise management typically grants management quasi-governmental
powers, including influence over the law-executing and law-enforcing apparatus in a
given locality, making the enforcement of shareholder rights difficult-despite  a panoply
19  In a typical  scheme,  for example,  managers  could transfer  assets  from  company  A in which  minority
shareholders  have a stake  to company  B (e.g., a management-controlled  pocket  company)  in which  they do
not in the following  way. Managers  of A require  A to sell some  output  to B at a controlled  price. B pays A
in goods  rather  than in cash, then  sells  the output  on domestic  or international  markets  at normal  prices.
Under  these  conditions,  managers  are able to turn A into a cost center  and B into a profit center  as in a
normal  case of transfer  pricing. But the addition  of inter-firm  barter  without  the premium  allows  managers
to hide A's true cost of production,  and to exaggerate  the amount  transferred  to B.
20 Richard  Ericson,  "The  Post-Soviet  Russian  Economic  System: An Industrial  Feudalism?"  SITE
Working  Paper 140,  Stockholm,  1999.
10of recent legislation intended to protect shareholders (Law on Joint-Stock Companies,
Jan. 1996; Privatization Law, July 1997). In those cases where i:here  is significant
residual shareholding by the state, there is often tacit cooperation between governmental
representatives on supervisory boards and management opposed to takeovers, to the
consolidation of outsider ownership, or to the enforcement of ownership prerogatives of
outsiders. These, of course, are long-standing allegations for which systematic evidence
is difficult to marshal. Several incidents of managerial obstruction, foot-dragging, and
non-compliance have been detailed. 2 '
Tax Arrears and Offsets as Subsidies
For the largest Russian enterprises, tax payments have been bargained ex post.
Tax payments with goods and through the use of offsets have allowed firms to economize
on cash payments to tax authorities. Domestically, these finns have been driven further
into the barter economy to avoid leaving a cash trail for the state to pick up.  Since the
Regional Governments have been unwilling to enforce the liquidation of insolvent firms,
profitable companies as well are encouraged to masquerade as bankrupt ones.  Thus both
profitable and insolvent Russian firms have incentives to avoid taxes.
The fact that goods used to pay taxes may not have an iramediate use constitutes
an implicit subsidy granted by the tax collector to the firm, and may explain their
increasing use among regional governments interested in maintaining employment levels
and the social benefits that firms grant employees. Moreover, bartered goods, in-kind
payments, and promissory notes are usually greater in price than their cash equivalents 22.
Pricing non-cash instruments at a premium can serve as an implicit subsidy. Tax
authorities issuing tax offset notes are often complicit with inflated pricing since it
enables the state, similarly, to increase its revenues. The managers are interested in
inflating revenues as it magnifies the perceived "size" of the enterprise, which may prove
useful as the firm bargains with regional governments.
Regional Governments and Enterprise Restructuring
Incumbent-managers of loss-making enterprises may have given up on the long-
term route of deriving wealth through increasing the value of the enterprise.  Selling their
shares is a limited option because of the costliness of exchanging ownership rights in the
Russian economy.  While the rational short-term strategy of the managers-owners is asset
stripping, then, the longer-run strategy is under-utilization of the remaining assets, barter
and accumulation of arrears, in order to maintain employment levels in their regions.
This last incentive, additionally, explains the liberal forbearance granted by tax
authorities-regional  and federal-towards  enforcing tax debt collection from these
21  Juliet  Johnson,  "Russia's Emerging  Financial-Industrial  Groups,'  Post-Soviet  Affairs 13, 4 (1997): .333-
365;  Bernard  Black, Reiner  Kraakman,  and Anna  Tarasova,  "Russian  Privatization  and Corporate
Governance:  What Went  Wrong?"  (mimeo,  1999).
22 According  to Commander  and  Mumssen  (1998,  p. 18),  in addition,  the fact that  goods used  to pay taxes
may  not have an imnmediate  use constitutes  an implicit  subsidy  granted  by tde tax collector  to the firm.
11firms.  Eventually, the enterprise may be viewed as an instrument of social policy in a
particular region, as well as a real-estate bequest to the heirs of the manager-owners. 23
Regional governments now actively obstruct enterprise restructuring via the
perpetuation of soft budget constraints, and in some cases through formal limitations on
enterprise activities.  Subsidies can take the form of preferential tax treatment, implicit
regionally-channeled subsidies through "discounts" on utility bills, and favored status in
public procurement, all of which are intended to prevent companies from shutting down
and laying off employees. This puts potentially productive companies at a cost
disadvantage, blocking investments and growth on their part. 24
More directly, regional and municipal governments may effectively ban
companies from laying off excess workers. Local authorities have the means to discipline
disobedient managers by, for example, subjecting them to troublesome fire, safety, health
and other inspections. 25
Renationalization by Regional Governments
Regional and municipal governments have also re-asserted property rights claims
in the wake of the August crisis.  Since mid 1998, de facto renationalizations of
previously privatized property have taken place among several well-known corporations.
The Belgorod iron-ore combine, Alkar Aluminum in Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsky
Metalurgichesky Zavod, Mikhailovsky Iron Works, Tatneft, Kamaz, Avtovaz, Zil, and
Moskvitch all underwent partial renationalization by the end of 1998. In 1999, further
takeovers have occurred in Sverdlovsk, Ulyanovsk, Krasnoyarsk, Voronezh, Primorye,
Chelyabinsk, and Moscow.26 In oil producing regions, shares of several oil companies
found their way into regional,  governments or regional government-owned companies-
including Komineft (Yamalo-Nenetsky), and ANKH (Irkutsk).  First, several "regional
investment vehicles" under the protection of local governments have been set up in order
to consolidate regional government holdings in important local industries.  In some cases
these are simply regional government-owned holding companies, which may have
attempted to increase their shares through a capital increase.  In other cases the regional
23 Without  a property  tax on unutilised  property,  offset  against  positive  profits  tax for profitable  enterprises,
there are few  disincentives  to hold  enterprise  real estate  for this purpose.
24 MGI reports  the case of obsolete  (sub-scale  and/or  inefficient  in their use of energy)  steel  and cement
plants  avoiding  shutdowns  by paying  for only  a fraction  of their energy  bills-their  largest  cost component.
Because  these  companies  are often  the major  employers  in a town,  municipal  and regional  officials  go to
great  lengths  to keep  them operating.  Regional  governments  channel  implicit  federal  energy  subsidies  to
these  companies  by letting arrears  to federal  suppliers  (Gazprom  and UES) accumulate  at the local gas and
electricity  distribution  companies.  These energy  distribution  companies  are often  under  effective  control  of
the regional  governments,  making  their  bankruptcy  practically  impossible.  These subsidies  slow  down
recovery  in many  manufacturing  sectors  by preventing  upgrading  investments  and industry  consolidation  in
and around  viable  industrial  assets.
25 The Novgorod region of Russia is a rare positive example of what can be done in today's Russia by
regional governments. It managed to attract more foreign direct investment than almost any other Russian
region, including nearby St. Petersburg, by removing red tape, facilitating access to land and offering tax
holidays to investors. As a result, the region has enjoyed economic growth since 1995, and over half of
industrial output is now coming from productive foreign companies.
26  Ericson, "The Post-Soviet Economic System," p. 10.
12governments have restructured debts owned by corporations by converting those debts
into equity.  Second, companies have invoked a 1996 Presidential Decree on wage and
tax arrears, repaying their tax debts to regional and federal budgets by issuing new stocks.
In one case-YUKOS-newly  issued shares wound up in the hands of a private owner
(in this case, the Menatep Group), and the revenues from those shares were transferred to
the budget.  In all other cases, however, government shares have increased in companies
under this arrangement. 27
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR OWNERSHIP TRANSFORMATION
Our aim, in the following section, is to reexamine some policy options to disentangle the
vicious circles of control discussed in sections II and III.  We propose a pilot for
transforming ownership in insider-dominated firms through a system of simultaneous tax
debt-for-equity conversion and resale through competitive auctions. The objective of this
pilot is to demonstrate by example to regional governments and to insiders that a more
sustainable way of protecting employment lies in providing managers with incentives to
increase the value of their enterprises. The proposed mechanism provides cash benefits
to insiders who agree to sell control to outside investors. The increased taxes will allow
the regional governments to finance safety nets to protect the unemployed and other
regional initiatives.
Option I: Bankruptcy and Creditor-Based Ownership Transf'ormation
Two fundamental changes to Russian bankruptcy procedures were put in place
following the passage of the,1998 Bankruptcy Act.  First, the law removed the
requirement of the previous law that courts undertake independent valuations of debtors'
assets and liabilities in order to determine whether a debtor was insolvent.  Regional
courts often refused to base insolvency on cash flows (basing them on net worth instead)
thus preventing creditors from being paid.  Second, creditors faced no incentives to
cooperate in their petitions against a debtor, resulting in coordination problems.  The new
law bases insolvency on cash flows, i.e., an inability to service debts over a prescribed
period.  In addition, the new law requires a creditor's committee to implement interim
management of an insolvent firm, and share in court costs.
Ownership transformation, therefore, is far more likely under the new bankruptcy
rules than under the old.  Any creditor (including a government authority owned tax
debts) can initiate a bankruptcy petition against a delinquent firm.  Under the terms of the
law, an external manager is appointed (by a committee of creditors) who attempts to
resolve all debt obligations.  If an out-of-court settlement ("amicable agreement) is
reached one of two outcomes are possible.  Either creditors acquire ownership, or an
interested external investor agrees to purchase the debts owed all creditors in order to
acquire ownership.  Without an amicable agreement, if the court declares the debtor
bankrupt, competitive proceedings are initiated.  In this last stage, a liquidator is
appointed to take possession of a debtor's assets and distribute claims from their sale pari
passu to the creditors.
27 Radygin,  "Ownership  and Control  of Russian  Industry,"  1999.
13In practice, however, there are three critical problems in relying upon bankruptcy
procedures to initiate ownership transformation. First, given the requirement of creditor
coordination, it is impossible to ensure that an investor can take ownership of a bankrupt
firm. It is the creditors who are given equity shares pro rata, and it is the creditors must
agree to a sale to a third party.  Bankruptcy is collective in nature, therefore all creditors
must share costs of the bankruptcy proceedings, and all must agree on external
management and other matters.  Second, ownership transformation based on bankruptcies
will ultimately rely on court procedures and on the capacity of the judicial system to
ensure success.  These are significant burdens to entrust to an already over-loaded
system.  Third, bankruptcy is a disruptive and often lengthy process, and if an amicable
agreement is not forthcoming, may encourage the antipathy of regional authorities
opposed to bankrupting a company in order to change ownership.  Despite these
problems, however, bankruptcy remains an important route once liquidators and judges
are trained and well paid. The credible threat of bankruptcy is needed to motivate
managers to agree to option II.
Option  II: Investment-Based  Ownership  Transformation  (IBOT)
Given the entrenchment of insiders in Russian enterprises, and given the small
likelihood that bankruptcy rules will encourage changes in ownership, IBOT of Russian
enterprises should be seriously considered as an alternative. The objective behind such a
move would be to create new majority owners by converting tax debt into equity that
would be sold immediately to external investors in competitive auctions.  These converted
shares, along with residual shares owned by governmental authorities, would constitute
significant percentages of share capital in several cases.  For reasons of manageability, it
may be more feasible, in the short term, to concentrate on the IBOT of enterprises with
significant tax debts to regional governments.  The pitfalls of such an approach, including
the problems of obtaining credible commitments by regional authorities to re-sell
converted shares, are both complex and variable.
There are two major pitfalls, which need to be addressed if this scheme is to be
further contemplated: one is what may be termed "investor capture," and the second,
"governmental capture."  The risk of investor capture is simply that IBOT will, once
again, open the door to rent-seeking by current enterprise insiders eager to expand their
control over productive assets in the Russian economy. As with the loans-for-shares
program, IBOT will encourage investors with well-hidden connections to the enterprise
to submit inflated bids, restricting competition for corporate control.  On the other hand,
governmental capture will occur if IBOT results in the renationalization of private
enterprises. Piecemeal IBOT-by  which a governmental body converts tax debts into
shares, then awaits an acceptable investor-can  also encourage governmental
administrators to restrict bidding to favored parties, or to otherwise bias the auction in the
interim.
This proposal assumes a pool of privatized companies in which typically the
mangers and the employees combined own a plurality of voting shares, while the residual
is in the hands of the federal and/or regional government.  Let us assume the company is
viable in the long run but loss making and illiquid in the short run.  It has also run up
significant tax arrears. The local government holds most of the bad debts and threatens
14the enterprise with a bankruptcy petition. The process should be managed by a local
"investment company", using the takeover model described in the case study (see box).
15Engineering  a Takeover:  The Case  of an Investment  Company
The XYZ Company had been privatized through variant II of the MPP and the managers and the
employees combined eventually accumulated close to 85% of the shares of the company.  On behalf of an
investor, Troika Dialog, a Moscow-based Investment Company needed to obtain more than 75% the XYZ
Company before an investor would be willing to invest in the reconstruction and modernization of XYZ's
facilities.  Renting out a room in the factory in which .o organize the purchase operation, a team of Troika
Dialog experts trained to execute on-site share purchasing mandates, organized and executed the purchase
of shares from the workers during the work day.
Manager and Worker Opposition
When talks between the investor and XYZ commenced, workers' representatives expressed strong
opposition to "outside" intervention in the company's activities. Employees' most commonly expressed
fear, naturally, was that of being summarily laid off by the new owners. In addition, many workers
understandably lacked basic knowledge of what corporate equity represents. This naivetd generated rumors
that the offered bid was too low or sellers would miss out on colossal future dividends. Many workers even
believed that they could not be fired while holding equity in XYZ.  The challenge was to respond
effectively to workers' concerns. Educating workers on the acquisition proceedings often quelled fears, but
not always, as employees were accustomed to a stark difference between promises and reality. Even on the
management level, good intentions were sometimes misunderstood. For example, the investor decided to
take some of XYZ's top management to visit a similar plant in Europe. The motivation was to provide the
factory managers and opportunities to witness first-hand the Investor's  corporate operations, culture and
philosophy. Instead of being impressed by the efficiency of the operation, however, XYZ managers noted
that the factory in Europe employed only 300 workers (well under XYZ's  number), and immediately feared
their work force would be downsized, thus re-igniting opposition. In the end, the investor gained
acceptance only through a pledge not to significantly reduce employment levels for two years.
The Regional Government
Regional governments posses a significant influence over the business of privatized enterprises:
they control access to inputs, transportation and enjoy tremendous discretion in granting licenses and
permits. The strategy of the investor for approaching an acquisition in Russia was to initiate discussions
first with target-factory directors, to determine potential interest. This tactic was based on their previous
experience of an attempted joint venture, which, after having been cleared at the federal and then local
levels, was rejected by plant directors. After initial contacts with senior management, the investor
approached local officials with their plans. Upon leaming that they had not been courted first, the
administration, both on the city and regional level, felt snubbed. Prior experience with investors had left a
bitter aftertaste, and, as such, the administrations were determined to retain control of the process. Troika
Dialog and the investor made numerous conciliatory visits before the administrative apparatus warmed to
their intentions.
Source: Troika  Dialogue
Foreign  consultancies  and investment  banks  have  had, in many cases,  limited
success in sustaining enterprise restructuring in the former Soviet Republics.  Therefore,
under this proposal, other options should be explored: e.g., strengthening local consulting
companies; establishing new consulting/advisory companies; forming restructuring teams
workout units of local banks, developing restructuring/workout teams in investment
16funds, etc.  Such schemes will presumably develop local skills and invest in people that.
will be interested in restructuring and workout "career paths." 28
Consideration of the risks mentioned above-capture  by "vlenal"  investors or by
governmental authorities-implies  that any transaction aimed at restructuring ownership
must comply with two requirements.  First, as mentioned above, newly acquired equity
must be simultaneously sold to external investors.  The partial renationalizations detailed
in the previous section occurred where shares acquired by governmental agencies were
not sold-either  because of an unwillingness to relinquish control, or because no
"suitable" investor could be found.  Second, resulting share packets (comprising of
converted debt and residual shares) must be sold by means involving some degree of
competition among prospective investors.  Competitive auctions in which bidders must
meet certain minimum standards, in this case, would be the optirnal solution.
These requirements, therefore, pose a central dilemma for an ownership
transformation mechanism. Simultaneous conversion and sale, on the one hand, can only
be accomplished if there is a priori investor interest in the share purchase. But if investor
interest is needed before the conversion takes place, it will preclude a competitive
auction. How, then, can these requirements be reconciled?  Given the experience of
privatization in Russia we will not attempt to offer a general solution but rather suggest a
pilot model to be financed by international financial institutions.
The components of the IBOT model are:
1.  A regional government receives a technical assistance/ institutional building loan
from a multilateral donor to hire an investment brokerage.  The investment brokerage
selects a "pool" of companies based on the following criteria: (i) basic viability (ii)
minimum tax arrears; and (iii) an agreement between the regional tax authorities and
the management-owners to dilute the latter's  share in ownership in exchange for part
of the proceeds from the transaction. The regional government interested in
collecting revenue from overdue and un-collectible arrears, 'convinces"  management,
under threat of bankruptcy, to accept the dilution.
2.  The regional government, according to the procurement rules of the multilateral
lender, conducts an open tender to select an investment brokerage, in effect, to "re-
privatize" the selected pool of companies. The formula for compensation of the
investment brokerage is based on a fixed fee that covers expenses of valuing the
whole pool, in addition to a success fee for each company successfully resold.
3.  The selected investment brokerage conducts a tender for the sale of selected
companies.  The value of these companies will provide a benchmark tax-debt-to-
28In a restructuring  project  financed  by the World  Bank  in Moldova,  over 300 consultants  and
entrepreneurs  have  been trained,  of which  over  a 100  are now  working  in the private  sector.  In a Bank
project  in Georgia  over 70 people  have been  trained  of which  5-6 have  already  left for the private  sector.
Sirmilar  results  have  been achieved  in Lithuania  through  a PHARE/World  Bank supported  enterprise-
restructuring  agency  Consulta  Ltd. Recently,  the Enterprise  Institutional  Buitding  Bureau  in Uzbekistan
has been active  in restructuring  and selling  stakes  in medium  scale  partially  privatized  enterprises.  (It sold
six SMEs  to foreign  investors  for a total  amount  of US$ 2.1  million  in one year).
17equity conversion rate and the bids will, in effect, represent the market valuation of
this rate (see balance sheets below).
4.  The investment brokerage, as part of the sale of the enterprise shares, will assist in the
conversion process of the outstanding tax debts to equity.  The conversion would take
place only as part of the transaction.
5.  Given the layoffs likely following the IBOT, such a scheme should be supported by a
compensatory program to assist the unemployed and to reduce their dependence on
enterprise-based social resources. (e.g. severance pay program financed by an IFI)
Suppose the market value of the firm is V, the minimum equity stake desired by
the prospective buyer a, the total tax debt outstanding T, and the debt-to-equity
conversion factor c, and a  and c = [0,1]. The buyer pays aV, and will receive a percent
of shares, (1 - a)V worth of shares being left with the incumbent shareholders.  The tax
authority will be forced to revalue its tax "assets" downward by (1 - c)T.  Finally, there
remains the crucial question of the utility to the incumbent majority shareholders, since
their agreement will be required before any IBOT can proceed.  Since the tax authority is
selling cT worth of shares to the new buyer, the residual aV  - cT represents a "payoff'  to
the insiders for accepting the dilution of their shares.
A numerical example of the balance sheet restruScturing  of such transaction will
illustrate: let us assume that a company, whose book value is $50 million, is sold for $30
million in a competitive tender. For simplicity, assume that its only liabilities are tax debts
and shareholder equity, and that the company is 100% manager-owned. 29 The investor
considers that acquiring 60% is the minimum stake required for control sufficient to carry
out restructuring.  Under the new share-capital structure, therefore, the outsider should
own $18m and the insiders $12m.  The tax debts of $45 m are converted to, e.g., shares
worth $15 m (a 1:3 ratio) to be sold to the outsider and the proceeds are transferred to the
tax authority. A residual of $3 m will be paid to the insiders in exchange for their
acquiescence in the dilution of their shares (from 100% to 40%).
Before  Ownership  Transformation  ($ millions)
Assets  50  Tax Arrears  45
Insider  Equity (100%)  5
Total  50  Total  50
29  Normally,  an enterprise  with  outstanding  tax debts would  not have positive  shareholders  equity,  as that
equity  would  be written  down  against  outstanding  claims. We are trying,  however,  to approximate  (albeit
crudely)  the situation  in some  Russian  firms where  unpaid  tax debts continue  to be listed  on the liabilities
side,  before  any write-downs  against  shareholders'  capital.  If such  a write-down  occurred,  creditors  (tax
authorities)  would  become  new owners-something we are trying  to avoid. Thus we propose  a mechanism
that allows  new investors  to, in effect,  buy off those debts,  then convert  them  into equity  claims.
18After Ownership Transformation ($millions)
Assets  50  Tax Arrezxs  0
Written Down  -20  Outsider Equity  18
Insider Equity  12
Total  30  Toi:al  30
Implementation Issues
For explanation, we have made certain assumptions regarding the IBOT
transaction that do not necessarily hold in the Russian context.  In this section we drop
some of these assumptions in order to determine the "robustness" of our method.
Conversion of Debts
In our example, all debts are held with tax authorities; we have left out liabilities
to: suppliers, lenders, and labor. Most important are the arrears of the companies to the
local gas and power distribution companies, which are often controlled by regional
governments. In principle, all of these liabilities could be converted to equity and
auctioned in a similar fashion, with the proceeds from sale being divided among all the
claimants pro rata. The control of local governments over suppliers - mainly the
distribution companies - could help coping with the creditors' coordination problem,
referred to above in the discussion of bankruptcy. It is advisable that all claims are
converted and sold simultaneously, in order to avoid the unintentional dilution of a
buyer's expected ownership.  We have also avoided distinguishing between levels of
government.  Although a large proportion of total tax arrears is currently held with the
federal government, the collection probability of these is lower than that of the debts to
the regional governments. The IBOT will have to include agreements between the federal
and regional creditors about offsetting these debts as part of the fiscal relationship
between the two.
Dilution of Ownership
In our example, all equity is held with insiders.  This is rarely the case in most
Russian firms, where formal control rights of insiders are 50-600%,  the remainder being
held by other legal entities, individuals, and the state. We do not distinguish between
insider and outsider incumbents, and in our example above, all incumbent shareholders
would see their ownership diluted by IBOT. Again, there is no reason in principle that
the "pay-off'  (ocV  - cT) cannot be distributed among all incumbent shareholders-
including the state-pro  rata.
A Pilot
A pilot could start with 1-2 cases of "voluntary liquidation" of companies with
significant tax arrears in order to: (i) make the threat of liquidation/bankruptcy credible;
(ii) train the trustees; and (iii) prepare for transparent auctions of saleable assets.  At the
same time the first group of local consultants will be receiving on-the-job training from
an internationally procured group of consultants (restructuring/workout/investment
companies) in few enterprises for which there is a realistic chance of obtaining outside
investment.
Alternatively, the pilot could use equity funds as a potential shortcut both to
finding the first company as well as the first investor. Through this route one could
19sacrifice broad-based competition in order to get a deal done quickly, but initially the
goal should be speed in completing one deal.  Also, just because one party refers a
candidate company does not mean that the bidding will not be open and competitive. The
EBRD's Russian regional venture funds, therefore, could be helpful in the initiating the
pilot.
Conclusion
The recent debates on the continuing Russian economic crisis, in general, have
been devoid of concrete policy solutions. The proposition that conventional liberal reform
will in the long run provide universal benefits will not be sufficient to persuade vested
interests that have acquired control over the political process to change the status quo.
The central challenge lies in building constituencies for reform by supporting new private
firms and reform-oriented regional governments so that they can lobby, persuade or
otherwise circumvent the coalitions that support existing economic distortions.  30 In the
short run a reasonable course of action is to move ahead with tender-based privatization,
while promoting an investment-based ownership transformation scheme along the lines
espoused in this paper-in  cooperation with multilateral development institutions-in  the
hope of producing some success stories to emulate.
It is clear that the critical role that regional governments play in limiting
enterprise restructuring in Russia can no longer be ignored.  Neither should one
disregard, however, the potentially positive role the regions could play in reviving real-
sector growth, were they to commit credibly to limiting the use of firms for income
redistribution. It is necessary to demonstrate by example that that a more sustainable way
of protecting employment lies in providing managers with incentives to increase the
value of their enterprises and attract outside investment. The increased taxes will allow
the regional governments to finance safety nets to protect employees and other regional
initiatives.  The proposals in this paper are intended to be a step in this direction.
30  There is, in sum, a need to challenge incumbent owners on multiple fronts:  to offer new products, open
trade, and stimulate the market for corporate control.  See, e.g., EBRD, Transition Report 1999 (London:
1999), p. 114.
20APPENDIX
A Game-Theoretic  Perspective  on Regional  Governments,  Minager-Owners,  and
Cash-Flow  Diversion
In this section we provide a simple, preliminary model of the interaction between
the managers-owners, described in section II and the regional governments described in
section III. The objective is to analyze the response of managers to a distortion imposed
by a regional government and to hypothesize whether the IBOT could help alleviate some
of the "cooperation failures" identified in this model.  As in previous work on the subject
of firm-government interactions, the model focuses on enterprises subject to political
distortions and describes a game between politicians and managers.31 We assume that the
relationship between firms and politicians is governed by incomplete contracts in which
the politicians derive a political benefit B(L) from the excess labor L employed by the
firm. We introduce the possibility of cash-flow diversion by the managers-owners, and
derive implications of interactions between regional governments and enterprise
managers-owners.
Instead of the classic case a firm with a large number of shareholders and a
manager, however, we consider the case of a firm that is 100% owvned  by insiders.  In
choosing to undertake restructuring, insiders must secure minimum financing from
outside investors, and offer in exchange a minimum equity stake in the firm.  In order to
approximate Russian cases more closely, we also assume that both existing cash flows
and any extra profits from restructuring are subject to theft or diversion by insiders.
Specifically, we assume that manager-owners obtain private benefits B(v), where v is the
proportion of cash flows diverted from returns on existing assets or new investment.
Suppose further that enterprise managers can decide the portion v of cash flows from
earnings Xt to be diverted for private benefit and they believe that the private benefit of
the diverted cash flow is higher that the legitimate net profits, B(v)>(l-t)XT.
Regional governments are capable of imposing the following distortion on firms
in their regions: through law, regulation, or intimidation, regional governments can force
firms to employ excess or unneeded labor L in the firm, i.e., workers in excess of what it
takes to produce output efficiently, such that, in the extreme, all the profits 7t  from
production are wiped out. The government derives greater political benefit than the total
wage cost of the excess workers: B(L)>wL. Regional governmenlts  derive revenue from a
tax rate t imposed .on firm's net profits, i.e. less the amount diverted before taxes by the
manager.  Added to the tax revenue is the political benefit of L, B(L), and deducted is the
possible cost of having to pay a share of the excess wage bill, vwL.  We interact the
excess wage bill with the cash-flow diversion ratio v, since if v=1, i.e. all profits are
diverted and nothing is left to pay L, the burden will have to be borne by the regional
government.  Under these assumptions, the utility of the regional government is:
U R =  t(l -v)oz-  VWL  +BR  (L)  (  1)
31 See esp. Andrei  Shleifer  and Robert  Vishny,  "Politicians  and  Firms," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics
111,4(1994): 995-1025.
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The maximum value of L that can be imposed upon the firm is its pre-tax profits i
divided by the wage rate, w. That is, the regional government can impose a level of
excess labor L such that all of the firm's pre-tax earnings are wiped out. 32 In addition to
net profits (taxable income is net of diverted cash flows and less wages paid to excess
workers), the managers-owners also enjoy private benefits of cash-flow diversion, given
by B(v). The utility function of the manager, then, is
UM = (1-t)[(l-v)r-  wL]  + BM  (v)  (3)
We can define the following two-period interaction between a regional
government and a privatized manager-owned firm: in the first period, the manager
decides what portion of cash flows should be diverted, while in the second the regional
government decides the excess-labor distortion to impose upon the firm. Both manager
and regional politician face certain tradeoffs, depending upon which variables are
allowed to be endogenously chosen.  If the manager can determine the level of v, and
thus determines the value of the firm, given r, he faces a trade off between value
maximization and private benefits, B(v).  Similarly, if regional governments can
determine the excess labor L, for a given tax rate, then it, too, faces a tradeoff between
maximizing revenues and maximizing the political benefits from excess labor.
Payoffs  to Manager  and Region  in Strategic  Form
Regional  Government




maximization  v-OPM:  (I1-t).r  SM:  V




diversion  DM:  B(v)  NM: B(v) - (I-t)r
SR:  0  NR:  B(L) - wL
If this game were played once, then the game has a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium: given that the manager has made a choice, the regional government would
simply impose L =LMQ,,,  and take all of the firm's earnings.  Anticipating that, the firm
would choose v=1 in order to leave as little as possible for the regional government to
expropriate via excess employment and taxes. Note that this is not a Pareto optimal
situation for either player, since both can be made better off by altering this institutional
32  Thus we see from the condition  B(L) >  wL, that  B(LMaX) >  t.
22arrangement such that the regional government resists using firns  as sources of political
benefits and the manager-owners do not divert cash-flows.
The payoffs in single-play are given in strategic form above.  Cell (i) is the Pareto
efficient outcome for both, where no distortions are imposed on the firm, and no cash
flows are diverted.  Both regional government and the manager, however, have strong
incentives to defect from this arrangement.  If the regional government defects while the
manager continues cooperation, the firm will see its profits lost in wages to excess
workers, while the region receives benefits from that employment (cell ii).  If the
manager defects and the regional government does not, the manager can wipe out any
revenues going to the region's treasury while receiving private benefits from diverted
cash flows (cell iii).  With rational foresight, neither player cooperates, and both receive
the Nash payoffs in cell (iv). The condition D>P>N>S suggests a classic single-play
prisoner's dilemma in which the "defect" strategy strictly dominates for each player.  In
sum, since the regional government cannot credibly commit to lying its hands, the firm
manager chooses to divert cash flows, and benefit privately.
Can IBOT Change the Incentives of the Players?
The managers now become agents of an outside investor, who spends resources
on monitoring their performance. Let us assume that after IBOT the outsider owns 100%
of the shares and thus, absent the threat of government expropriation, the new owner
would have demanded that the managers eliminate cash-flow diversion v, since by
definition v accrues to managers and no one else.  This makes a commitment by firms to
lower v more credible for the government.
IBOT requires managers to relinquish private benefits of control in the next
period of play, and to reduce their cash-flow rights.  For the regional government, IBOT
requires that the political benefits of employment be foregone in the next period, while
reducing the cost of excess labor to be borne by the government if the managers diverted
all the cash flow and could not pay the extra workers.  Upon playing the IBOT strategy,
more importantly, the continuation value of cooperating in subsequent periods increases.
If the regional government, following IBOT, begins to re-impose politically-motivated
distortions, then it risks losing cash tax payments (which were not forthcoming before
IBOT). The new owners, following IBOT, have fewer incentives to divert cash flows
because they do not have the opportunities enjoyed by the insider-owners in the previous
game.
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